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Abstract—In the digital era, users share their personal data
with service providers to obtain some utility, e.g., access to
high-quality services. Yet, the induced information flows raise
privacy and integrity concerns. Consequently, cautious users
may want to protect their privacy by minimizing the amount
of information they disclose to curious service providers. Service
providers are interested in verifying the integrity of the users’
data to improve their services and obtain useful knowledge for
their business. In this work, we present a generic solution to
the trade-off between privacy, integrity, and utility, by achieving
authenticity verification of data that has been encrypted for
offloading to service providers. Based on lattice-based homo-
morphic encryption and commitments, as well as zero-knowledge
proofs, our construction enables a service provider to process and
reuse third-party signed data in a privacy-friendly manner with
integrity guarantees. We evaluate our solution on different use
cases such as smart-metering, disease susceptibility, and location-
based activity tracking, thus showing its promising applications.
Our solution achieves broad generality, quantum-resistance, and
relaxes some assumptions of state-of-the-art solutions without
affecting performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
In our inter-connected world, people share personal infor-
mation collected from various entities, networks, and ubiq-
uitous devices (i.e., data sources) with a variety of service
providers, in order to obtain access to services and applica-
tions. Such data flows, which typically involve a user, a data
source, and a service provider (as depicted in Figure 1), are
common for a wide range of use cases, e.g., smart metering,
personalized health, location-based activity tracking, dynamic
road tolling, business auditing, loyalty programs, and pay-as-
you-drive insurance. However, due to conflicting interests of
the involved parties, such data interactions inherently introduce
a trade-off between privacy, integrity, and utility.
Some users seek to protect their privacy by minimizing the
amount of personal information that they disclose to curious
third-parties. Service providers are interested in maintaining
the value obtained from the users’ data. To this end, service
providers are concerned about verifying the integrity of the
data shared by their users, i.e., ensure that the user’s data has
been certified by a trusted, external, data source. Both parties
want to obtain some utility from these data flows: Service
providers want to use the data for various computations that
yield useful knowledge for their business or services, and users
share part of their data to obtain services and applications.
Thus, in this work we present a solution that enables flexible
computations on third-party signed data offloaded to a service
provider in a privacy and integrity preserving manner.
To illustrate the inherent trade-off between privacy, integrity,
and utility, we detail some of the use cases (more use cases
are described in Appendix B):
Smart Metering. Smart meters (i.e., data sources) measure the
consumption of a user’s household. The data is shared with a
service provider (e.g., a different legal entity) for billing and
load-balancing analysis. User’s privacy can be jeopardized as
energy consumption patterns can reveal her habits [29], [68].
The service provider wants guarantees on the data integrity to
provide reliable services [11]. Malicious users might cheat to
reduce their bills or disrupt the service provider’s analysis.
Disease Susceptibility. Medical centers and direct-to-
consumer services [4], [90], provide a user with her DNA
sequence to improve her health and to customize her treat-
ments. Genomic data can be used for disease-susceptibility
tests offered by service providers, e.g., research institutions
that seek to form the appropriate cohorts for their studies.
The user wants to protect her privacy as DNA is considered
a very sensitive and immutable piece of information for her
and her relatives [45]. Correspondingly, service providers are
keen on collecting users’ data and verifying its integrity so
that they can use it for disease-risk estimation or other types
of analyses, e.g., drug-effect prediction or health certificates.
Malicious users might tamper with the genomic data they share
to disrupt this process and pass a medical examination.
Location-Based Activity Tracking. A user’s wearable device
monitors her location by querying location providers. The user
then shares this information with service providers, e.g., online
fitness social networks [63] or insurance companies [2] to
obtain activity certificates or discount coupons. As location
data can reveal sensitive information, e.g., her home/work
places or habits [91], [61], the user is concerned about her
privacy. Service providers want legitimate data to issue activity
certificates, provide discounts for performance achievements,
and build realistic user profiles. Malicious users might be
tempted to modify their data, aiming to claim fake accom-
plishments and obtain benefits they are not entitled to.
The above use-cases fall under the three-party model of
Figure 1, with malicious users, and honest-but-curious service
providers and data sources; as such, they exhibit the trade-
off between privacy, integrity, and utility. To support integrity
protection regarding users’ data, service providers require a
data source to certify it, e.g., by means of a digital signature.
This certification should require minimal to no changes to
the data source: using only deployed hardware and software
infrastructure. Another common denominator is that service
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Figure 1: Three-party model and their interaction phases. is
the private information authenticated with . The user protects
it via . The service provider computes ψ(·) on the protected
data and obtains an output which is revealed as m.
providers want to collect users’ data and perform various
computations. Consequently, users should be able to offload
their protected data to service providers (i.e., transfer a copy
of the data once) in such a way that their privacy is preserved,
the data integrity can be verified, and various flexible compu-
tations are feasible.
A simple solution is to establish a direct communication
channel between the data source and the service provider. This
way, the data source could compute the operations queried by
the service provider on the user’s data. However, this would
prevent the user from remaining in control of her data and
require the data source to bear computations that are outside of
its interests. Another approach is to let the data source certify
the user’s data by using specialized digital signature schemes
such as homomorphic signatures [21], [26], [27], [28], [56]
or homomorphic authenticators [6], [48], [54], [86]. Thus, the
user could locally compute the queried operation and provide
the service provider with the result and a homomorphic sig-
nature attesting its correct computation on her data. However,
this would require software modifications at the data source,
which would come at a prohibitive cost for existing services,
and introduce significant overhead at the user.
In the existing literature, several works specialize in the
challenges imposed by the above use cases but provide only
partial solutions by either addressing privacy [12], [32], [40],
[41], [71], [72], or integrity [22], [37], [82], [85]. The hand-
ful of works addressing both challenges require significant
modifications to existing hardware or software infrastruc-
tures. For instance, SecureRun [84], which achieves privacy-
preserving and cheat-proof activity summaries, requires heavy
modifications to the network infrastructure. Similarly, smart
metering solutions using secure aggregation, e.g., [5], [73],
[76], rely on specialized signature schemes that are not yet
widely supported by current smart meters. These approaches
are tailored to their use case and cannot be easily adapted to
others, hence there is the need for a generic solution to the
trade-off between privacy and integrity, without significantly
degrading utility.
ADSNARK [13] is a generic construction that could be
employed to address the trade-off between privacy, integrity,
and utility. In particular, it enables users to locally compute on
data certified by data sources and to provide proof of correct
computation to service providers. However, ADSNARK does
not support the feature of data offloading that enables service
providers to reuse the collected data and to perform various
computations. Furthermore, it requires a trusted setup, and is
not secure in the presence of quantum adversaries [66]. The
latter should be taken into account considering recent advances
in quantum computing [10] and the long term sensitivity of
some data.
In this work we propose CRISP (privaCy and integRIty
preServing comPutations), a novel solution that achieves
utility, privacy, and integrity; it is generic, supports data
offloading with minimal modification to existing infrastruc-
tures, relaxes the need for a trusted setup, and is quantum-
resistant. To protect users’ privacy while offloading data,
CRISP relies on quantum-resistant lattice-based approximate
homomorphic encryption (HE) primitives [35] that support
flexible computations on encrypted data without degrading
utility. To ensure data integrity, we employ lattice-based
commitments [16] and zero-knowledge proofs [31] based on
the multi-party-computation-in-the-head (or MPC-in-the-head)
paradigm [64], which enable users to simultaneously convince
service providers about the correctness of the encrypted data,
as well as the authenticity of the underlying plaintext data,
using the deployed certification mechanism.
We evaluate our solution on three use-cases covering a wide
range of applications and computations: smart metering, dis-
ease susceptibility, and location-based activity-tracking. Our
experimental results show that our construction introduces
acceptable computation overhead for users to privately offload
their data and for service providers to both verify its authentic-
ity and to perform the desired computations. The magnitude
of the communication overhead fluctuates between tens and
hundreds of mega bytes per proof and is highly dependent
on the use case and its security requirements. To this end, in
Section VI, we also present different optimizations that can
reduce the proof size, thus making our construction practi-
cal for real-life scenarios. Additionally, we demonstrate that
CRISP achieves high accuracy in the computations required
by the use cases, yielding an average absolute accuracy of
more than 99.99% over their respective datasets. Compared to
the state-of-the-art [13], we reach comparable performance and
achieve post-quantum security guarantees with more flexibility
in the computations.
Our contributions are the following:
• A generic, quantum-resistant solution that enables privacy
and integrity preserving computations in the three-party
model of Figure 1, with minimal modifications of the
existing infrastructure;
• the necessary primitives to achieve authenticity verifica-
tion of homomorphically encrypted data in the quantum
random oracle model;
• an implementation of CRISP and its performance eval-
uation on various representative use-cases that rely on
different types of computations and real-world datasets.
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To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time such a solution
is proposed.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we discuss
the system and threat model on which our construction oper-
ates. In Section III, we introduce useful cryptographic primi-
tives. Then we present CRISP’s architecture in Section IV and
in Section V we perform its privacy and security analysis. In
Section VI we evaluate CRISP on various use-cases, and in
Section VII we discuss some of its aspects. We review the
related work in Section VIII and conclude in Section IX.
II. MODEL
We describe the model, assumptions, and objectives of
CRISP.
A. System Model
We consider three entities: a user, a service provider, and
a data source, as depicted in Figure 1. The user obtains
from the data source certified data about herself and/or her
activities, she subsequently shares it with the service provider
to obtain some service. The user is interested in sharing
(i.e., offloading) her data while protecting her privacy, i.e.,
she wants to have full control over it but still obtain utility
from the service provider. The service provider is interested
in (i) verifying the authenticity of the user’s data, and (ii)
performing on it multiple computations that are required to
provide the service and/or improve its quality. The data source
can tolerate only minimal changes to its operational process
and cannot cope with any heavy modification to the underlying
infrastructure and dependencies of the hardware and software.
Finally, we assume the existence of a public key infrastructure
that verifies the identities of the involved parties as well as
secure communication channels between the user and the data
source, and between the user and the service provider.
B. Threat Model
We present the assumed adversarial behavior for the three
entities of our model with computationally bounded adver-
saries.
Data Source. The data source is considered honest and is
trusted to generate valid authenticated data about the users’
attributes or activities.
Service Provider. The service provider is considered honest-
but-curious, i.e., it abides by the protocol and does not engage
in denial-of-service attacks. However, it might try to infer as
much information as possible from the user’s data and perform
computations on it without the user’s consent.
User. We consider a malicious but rational user. In other
words, she engages in the protocol and will try to cheat only
if she believes that she will not get caught – and hence be
identified and banned – by the service provider. The user
is malicious in that she might try to modify her data, on
input or output of the data exchange, in order to influence
the outcome of the service provider’s computations to her
advantage. Nonetheless, the user is rational, as she desires to
obtain utility from the service provider and thus engages in
the protocol.
C. Objectives
Overall, the main objective of our construction is to provide
the necessary building blocks for secure and flexible compu-
tations in the considered three-party model. To this end, user’s
privacy should be protected by keeping her in control of the
data even in a post-quantum adversarial setting, and the service
provider’s utility should be retained by ensuring the integrity
of the processed data. The above objectives should be achieved
by limiting the impact on already deployed infrastructures,
thus, by requiring only minimal changes to the data source’s
operational process. More formally, the desired properties are:
(a) Utility: Both user and service provider are able to obtain
the correct result of a public computation on the user’s private
data; (b) Privacy: The service provider does not learn anything
more than the output of the computation on the user’s private
data; and (c) Integrity: The service provider is ensured that
the computation is executed on non-corrupted data certified by
the data source.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce the cryptographic primitives used in Sec-
tion IV to instantiate CRISP. In the remaining of the paper,
let a ← χ denote that a is sampled from a distribution χ;
a vector be denoted by a boldface letter, e.g., x, with x[i]
its i-th element and xT its transpose. For a complex number
z ∈ C, we denote by z¯ its conjugate. Moreover, let ‖ denote
the concatenation operation, In the identity matrix of size n,
and 0k a vector of k zeros. See Appendix E for a summary
of our notation.
A. Approximate Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a particular type of encryption
that enables computations to be executed directly on cipher-
texts. The most recent and practical homomorphic schemes
rely on the hardness of the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE)
problem which states that, given a polynomial ring Rq , for a
secret polynomial s, it is computationally hard for an adversary
to distinguish between (a, a · s + e) and (a, b), where e is a
short polynomial sampled from a noise distribution, and a, b
are polynomials uniformly sampled over Rq .
Cheon et al. recently introduced the CKKS cryptosys-
tem [35] (improved in [33]), an efficient and versatile lev-
eled homomorphic scheme that supports approximate inte-
ger and complex arithmetic operations. It uses an isomor-
phism between complex vectors and the plaintext space
Rq=Zq[X]/(XN+1), where q is a large modulus, and N is
a power-of-two integer. The decryption of a ciphertext yields
the input plaintext in Rq with a small error. This small error
can be seen as an approximation in fixed-point arithmetic.
In CKKS, given a ring isomorphism between CN/2 and
R[X]/(XN+1), a complex vector z∈CN/2 can be encoded
into a polynomial m denoted by a vector m of its coeffi-
cients {m0, . . .,mN−1}∈RN as m= 1N (U¯T ·z+UT ·z¯), where
U denotes the (N/2)×N Vandermonde matrix generated by
the 2N -th root of unity ζj=e5
jpii/N . This transformation
is extended to Rq by a quantization. Then, considering a
maximum number of levels L, a ring modulus q=
∏L−1
i=0 qi is
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chosen with {qi} a set of number theoretic transform (NTT)-
friendly primes such that ∀i∈[0, L− 1], qi=1 mod 2N .
Let χerr, χenc, and χkey, be three sets of small distributions
over Rq . Then, for an encoded plaintext m ∈ Rq , the scheme
works as follows:
KeyGen(λ,N,L, q): for a security parameter λ and a number
of levels L, generate sk=(1, s) with s← χkey, pk=(b, a)
with a←Rq , b=− a · s+ e mod q, and e←χerr. Additional
keys which are useful for the homomorphic computations (i.e.,
rotation, evaluation keys, etc.) are denoted by evk. We refer
the reader to [59] for further details.
Encryption(m,pk): for r0 ← χenc and e0, e1 ← χerr, output
ct=(ct0, ct1)=r0 · pk + (m+ e0, e1) mod q.
Decryption(sk, ct): Output mˆ=〈ct, sk〉 mod ql, where 〈·, ·〉
denotes the canonical scalar product in Rql and l the current
level of the ciphertext.
For brevity, we denote the above three operations as
KeyGen(λ,N, q), Encpk(m), and Decsk(ct), respectively.
The scheme’s different parameters are chosen in conjunction
with the security level required (see [30]) to protect the inputs
and ensure privacy.
B. BDOP Commitment
Baum et al. [16] proposed the BDOP commitment scheme,
that enables us to prove in zero-knowledge certain properties
of the committed values to a verifier. Based on lattices, this
scheme also builds on a polynomial ring Rq=Zq/(XN+1),
with the notable exception that q is a prime that satisfies
q=2d+1 mod 4d, for some power-of-two d smaller than N .
BDOP is based on the hardness assumption of the module
Short Integer Solution (SIS) and module Learning with Error
(LWE) [70] to ensure its binding and hiding properties. We
refer the reader to [16] for more details. For a secret message
vector m∈Rlcq , and for a commitment with parameters (n, k),
two public rectangular matrices A′1 and A
′
2, of size n×(k−n)
and lc×(k−n−lc) respectively, are created by uniformly sam-
pling their coefficients from Rq . To commit the message m,
we sample rc←Skβ , where Skβ is the set of elements in Rq
with l∞-norm at most β and bounded degree, and compute
BDOP(m, rc) =
(
c1
c2
)
=
(
A1
A2
)
· rc +
(
0n
m
)
,
with A1=[In‖A′1] and A2=[0lc×n‖Ilc‖A′2].
The BDOP commitment scheme can be used, with a Σ-
protocol, to provide a bound proof : proof that a committed
value is in a bounded range [15]. The main rationale behind
this is to prove in zero-knowledge that the committed value
plus a small value has a small norm. Given a commitment
c=BDOP(m, rc), the prover computes a commitment for a
vector of small values µ as t=BDOP(µ,ρ) and commits to
this commitment in an auxiliary commitment caux=Caux(t).
The verifier selects a challenge d ∈ {0, 1} and sends it to the
prover who verifies its small norm and eventually opens caux.
The prover also opens t+d·c to z=µ+d·m and rz=ρ+d·rc.
Upon reception, the verifier checks that BDOP(z, rz)=t+ d ·
c and that the norms are small. The protocol, presented in
Appendix C, is repeated to increase soundness and can be
made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
C. Zero-Knowledge Circuit Evaluation
Zero-knowledge circuit evaluation (ZKCE) protocols enable
a user to prove the knowledge of an input that yields a public
output on an arithmetic or Boolean circuit that implements a
specific one-way public function [31], [55]. A circuit is defined
as a series of gates connected by wires. Based on the multi-
party computation (MPC) in-the-head approach from Ishai
et al. [64], ZKCE techniques emulate players and create a
decomposition of the circuit (see Appendix A). The secret is
shared among the emulated players, who evaluate the circuit
in a MPC fashion and commit to their respective states. The
prover then reveals the states of a subset of players depending
on the verifier’s challenge. By inspecting the revealed states,
the verifier builds confidence in the prover’s knowledge.
In particular, ZKB++ [31] is a Σ-protocol for languages
of the type {y | ∃x s.t. y=Φ(x)}, where Φ(·) is the repre-
sentation of the circuit. With randomized runs, the verifier
builds confidence in the prover’s knowledge of the secret. The
number of iterations is determined according to the desired
soundness: For instance, to prove the knowledge of a message
that yields a specific SHA-256 digest, a security level of 128-
bits requires 219 iterations. The proof size is linked to the
number of iterations but also to the number of gates that
require non-local computations (e.g., AND for Boolean cir-
cuits, multiplication for arithmetic ones). Compared to earlier
work, i.e., ZKBoo [55], ZKB++ reduces the proof size by not
sending information that can be computed by the verifier. The
security of ZKB++ is based on the quantum random oracle
model. Overall, it achieves the following properties: (a) 2-
privacy, opening two out of the three players’ views to the
verifier reveals no information regarding the secret input, (b)
soundness, a correct execution yields a valid witness with
soundness error linked to the number of iterations, and (c)
completeness, an honest execution of ZKB++ ensures a correct
output.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
We now present our construction that enables computa-
tions on third-party certified data in a privacy and integrity
preserving manner. It builds on (i) CKKS to encrypt the
data and enable computations on it, and (ii) MPC-in-the-head
and BDOP commitments to simultaneously verify a custom
circuit that checks the integrity of the data and its correct
encryption. Its workflow is decomposed into five phases:
collection, transfer, verification, computation, and release. (1)
In the collection phase, the user obtains data about herself or
her activities from the data source, along with a certificate
that vouches for its integrity and authenticity. (2) The user
then encrypts the data, generates a proof for correct encryption
of the certified data, and sends it with the ciphertexts to the
service provider. (3) The service provider verifies the proof
in the verification phase. Then, (4) it performs the desired
computations on it, and (5) communicates with the user to
obtain the corresponding result in the release phase. We detail
each phase below.
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A. Collection Phase
In this phase, the user (identified by her unique identifier
uid) collects from the data source certified data about herself
or her activities. The data source certifies each user’s data point
x using a digital signature σ(·) that relies on a cryptographic
hash function H(·) to ensure integrity. We opt for SHA-256
as the hash function due to its widespread use as an accepted
standard for hash functions [80]; our solution works with any
signature scheme building on it. For example, Bernstein et
al. [19] recently proposed a quantum-secure signature scheme
employing SHA-256. In more detail, the data source generates
a payload msg={nonce, uid,x} and sends to the user a
message M0 defined by: M0={msg, σ(H(msg))}.
B. Transfer Phase
In this phase, the user protects her certified data points
with the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme (see Sec-
tion III-A) and generates a proof of correct protection. To
this end, CRISP employs a ZKCE approach to simultaneously
prove the integrity of the underlying data and its correct
encryption, i.e., to convince a service provider that the noises
used for encryption did not distort the plaintexts. In particular,
the user evaluates a tailored circuit C (depicted in Figure 2)
that (i) computes the encryption of the data with the CKKS
scheme, (ii) generates BDOP commitments to the noises used
for encryption, and (iii) produces the hash digests of the
messages signed by the data source to verify their integrity.
For ease of presentation, we describe the circuit that processes
one data point x. However, this can easily be extended to a
vector d obtained from multiple data points {xi}. The cir-
cuit’s public parameters are the encryption public information
pk, U,N , the matricesA1,A2 used in the BDOP commitment
scheme and its parameter n, and additional information such
as the user’s identifier. The circuit’s private inputs are the
user’s secret data point x and nonce, the encryption private
parameters r0, e0, and e1, and the private parameters of
the BDOP commitment scheme rc. These inputs are arith-
metically secret-shared among the three simulated players,
according to the ZKB++ protocol. The outputs of the circuit
are the ciphertext ct, the commitment to the encryption noises
Cbdop=BDOP((r0, e0, e1)T , rc), and the digest of the message
H(msg) signed by the data source.
CKKS and BDOP operate on slightly different polynomial
rings, as described in Section III. Consequently, we extend
BDOP to the composite case where q is a product of NTT-
friendly primes. We relax the strong condition on the challenge
space from [16] that all small norm polynomials in Rq be
invertible. This condition is required for additional zero knowl-
edge proofs that are not used in our construction. We simply
require that the challenge space of invertible elements be large
enough to ensure the binding property of the commitment.
In particular, considering that the divisors of zero in Rq are
equally distributed in a ball B of norm βc as in Rq , the
probability of having a non-invertible element when uniformly
sampling from B is at most N ·L
2l
, where L is the number of
prime factors in q, each having at least l bits. As a result,
the number of invertible elements in B is lower-bounded by
|B| ∗ (1−N ·L
2l
), where |B|=(βc + 1)N is the cardinality of
the ball. Thus, by adequately choosing βc and the product of
primes, we create a sufficiently large challenge set of small-
norm invertible elements in Rq (e.g., > 2256). Moreover, we
note that our circuit requires computations to be executed on
the underlying arithmetic ring Zq used for the lattice-based
encryption and commitment schemes, as well as a Boolean
ring Z2 for the computation of the SHA-256 hash digests. We
also design a block that converts MPC-in-the-head arithmetic
shares of the input data of the circuit into Boolean ones.
Overall, our circuit C consists of four blocks, showed in
Figure 2: encryption, commitment, conversion, and hash block.
Encryption Block. This block operates in the arithmetic ring
Zq and takes as inputs the vector of integers in Zq derived
by quantization from the plaintext x produced during the data
collection phase (see Section IV-A), as well as the encryption
with private noise parameters r0, e0, and e1. It first encodes the
secret input data to a polynomial m ∈ Rq before computing
the ciphertext ct=(ct0, ct1)=r0 · pk + (m+ e0, e1) mod q.
This step requires only affine operations that can be computed
locally for each simulated player of ZKB++ protocol. The
encryption block is depicted in the middle part of Figure 2.
Commitment Block. This block also operates in the arithmetic
ring Zq; its inputs are the private parameters of the encryption
(i.e., r0, e0, and e1) and commitment (i.e., rc) schemes. As
the commitment scheme has the same external structure as the
encryption one, this block operates equivalently and returns
BDOP((r0, e0, e1)T , rc), requiring only local operations at
each simulated player. An overview of the commitment block
is shown in the leftmost part of Figure 2.
Conversion Block. This block enables us to interface two
types of circuits that would otherwise be incompatible when
following a ZKCE approach. The main idea is to transform
an arithmetic secret sharing into a Boolean secret sharing in
the context of MPC-in-the-head. Let [x]B denote the Boolean
sharing of a value x and [x]A its arithmetic one. An arithmetic
additive secret sharing in Zq splits x into three sub-secrets
x0, x1, and x2 such that x=x0+x1+x2 mod q. Let xki , be
the k-th bit of the arithmetic sharing of the secret x for
player i. A Boolean sharing [x]B cannot be directly translated
from [x]A as the latter does not account for the carry when
adding different bits. Considering that the modulus q can be
represented by |q| bits, the conversion block generates |q|
Boolean sub-secrets [y]jB={yj0, yj1, yj2}B , such that
∀j ∈ [1, |q|] : xj =
2⊕
i=0
yji ,
where ⊕ denotes the XOR operation (i.e., addition modulo 2),
and xj is the j-th bit of x. When designing such a block in
the MPC-in-the-head context, we must make the circuit (2,3)-
decomposable (see Appendix A) and ensure the 2-privacy
property, i.e., revealing two out of the three players’ views to
the verifier should not leak any information about the input.
To reconstruct the secret in zero-knowledge and obtain a bit-
wise secret sharing, the procedure is as follows: For every bit,
starting from the least significant one, the conversion block
computes (i) the sum of the bits held by each player, plus
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Figure 2: Overview of the verification circuit C. Its inputs are denoted by rectangles and its outputs by rounded rectangles.
the carry from the previous bits, and (ii) the carry of the bit.
The computation of the carry requires interaction between the
different players (i.e., making the operation a “multiplicative”
one), hence we design a conversion block with a Boolean
circuit that minimizes the amount of multiplicative gates.
More precisely, we design a bit-decomposition block for
MPC-in-the-head building on Araki et al. ’s optimized conver-
sion [9] between a power-of-two arithmetic ring and a Boolean
ring. Let Maj(·) be the function returning the majority bit
among three elements. Then, the conversion circuit, for every
bit k ∈ [1, |x|], does the following:
1) locally reads [αk]B = {xk0 , xk1 , xk2} (i.e., for each player);
2) computes the first carry [βk]B amongst those inputs:
βk = Maj(xk0 , x
k
1 , x
k
2) = (x
k
0 ⊕ xk2 ⊕ 1)(xk1 ⊕ xk2)⊕xk1 ;
3) computes the second carry [γk]B among those inputs with
γ0 = β0 = 0:
γk = Maj(αk, βk−1, γk−1) = (αk⊕γk−1⊕1)(βk−1⊕γk−1)⊕βk−1;
4) sets the new Boolean sharing of the secret to
[y]kB = [αk]⊕ [βk−1]⊕ [γk−1].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a bit-
decomposition circuit is used for MPC-in-the-head, which
enables to interface circuits working in different rings.
Hash Block. This block uses the SHA-256 circuit presented
in [55] to compute the hash digest of the message msg =
{nonce, uid,x} signed by the data source in the collection
phase.
Full Circuit. With the above building blocks, and following
the ZKB++ protocol, the user generates a proof that can
convince the service provider that she has not tampered with
the data obtained by the data source.
Furthermore, using BDOP’s bound proof protocol (see
Section III-B) the user produces a proof of correct encryption,
i.e., that the encryption noise has not distorted the underlying
plaintext. The cryptographic material of the combined proofs
(ZKCE & BDOP) is denoted by P . At the end of the transfer
phase, the user sends to the service provider the message:
M1={ct,Cbdop,P, H(msg), σ(H(msg)), C}.
C. Verification Phase
Upon reception of a message M1, the service provider veri-
fies the signature using the provided hash digest. If satisfied, it
verifies the proof P by first evaluating the circuit C following
the ZKB++ protocol and then checking the bound proof for the
encryption noises. Hence, it is assured that ct is the encryption
of a data point x giving the hash that has been certified by
the data source.
D. Computation Phase
Using the homomorphic capabilities of the CKKS encryp-
tion scheme, the service provider can perform any operation
with a bounded predefined multiplicative depth (and arbitrary
depth, with bootstrapping [34]) on validated ciphertexts re-
ceived by the user. In particular, CKKS enables the computa-
tion of a wide range of operations on ciphertexts: additions,
scalar operations, multiplications, and a rescaling procedure
that reduces the scale of the plaintexts. Those functions enable
the computation of polynomial functions on the ciphertexts.
Moreover, it supports the evaluation of other functions such
as exponential, inverse or square root [35], [34], [36], by
employing polynomial approximations (e.g., least squares).
Hence, the service provider can independently compute any
number of operations on the user’s encrypted data simply
requiring interactions with the user to reveal their outputs (see
Section IV-E).
E. Release Phase
At the end of the computation phase, the service provider
holds a ciphertext of the desired output that can only be
decrypted by the holder of the secret key. To this end, the
service provider and the user engage in a two-round release
protocol, which ensures both of them that the decrypted output
is the expected result of the computation on the user’s data.
The release protocol is depicted in Figure 3 and detailed next.
Let ctψ denote the ciphertext obtained by the service
provider after performing computations on validated cipher-
text(s), and mˆ the corresponding plaintext. First, the service
provider informs the user of the computation ψ(·) whose result
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User Service Provider
ct , B⌫,⌘(ct ), C0, (·) C0=Com(⌫, ⌘)
mˆ=Decsk(ct )
mˆB=Decsk(B⌫,⌘(ct ))
C1=Com(mˆ, mˆB) C1
Open C0
B⌫,⌘(mˆ)
?
= mˆB
Open C1 B⌫,⌘(mˆ)
?
= mˆB
Figure 3: Release protocol for a computed value mˆ.
it wants to obtain. Then, the service provider homomorphically
blinds ct by applying the function B⌫,⌘(x)=⌫·x+⌘, with ⌫
and ⌘ uniformly sampled in Z⇤q and Zq resp., and commits
to the secret parameters used for blinding (i.e., ⌫, ⌘) using
a hiding and binding cryptographic commitment Com(·) as
C0=Com(⌫, ⌘). A hash-based commitment scheme can be
used for this purpose [31]. Subsequently, the service provider
sends to the user the encrypted result ct , its blinding
B⌫,⌘(ct ), and the commitment C0. Upon reception, if the
user accepts the computation  (·), she decrypts both cipher-
texts as: Decsk(ct )=mˆ and Decsk(B⌫,⌘(ct ))=mˆB , and
verifies that mˆ matches the expected result of the computation.
If the user’s check succeeds, she commits to the decrypted
results, i.e., C1=Com(mˆ, mˆB), and communicates C1 to the
service provider who opens the commitment C0 to the user
(i.e., revealing ⌫, ⌘). The user verifies that the initial blinding
was correct by checking if B⌫,⌘(mˆ)
?
=mˆB . If this is the
case, she opens the commitment C1 (i.e., revealing mˆ, mˆB)
to the service provider who verifies that the cleartext result
matches the blinded information (i.e., by also checking if
B⌫,⌘(mˆ)
?
=mˆB). At the end of the release phase, both parties
are confident that the decrypted output is the expected result
of the computation, whereas the service provider learns only
the computation’s result and nothing else about the user’s data.
V. PRIVACY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
CRISP protects the user’s privacy by revealing only the
output of the agreed computation on her data, and it protects
the service provider’s integrity by preventing any cheating or
forgery from the user. Here, we present an analysis of these
two properties providing sketches about their corresponding
proofs. The used lemmas and propositions as well as the full
proofs are presented in Appendix D.
A. Privacy
Proposition V.1. Consider a series of messages {msgi}
certified by the data source with a digital signature scheme
 (·) that uses a cryptographic hash functionH(·) with nonces.
Assume that the parameters of the CKKS (N, q, enc, key, err)
and BDOP ( , k, n, q,N) schemes have been configured to
ensure post-quantum security, that the circuit C is a valid
(2,3)-decomposition, and that the cryptographic commitment
Com(·) is hiding and binding. Then, our solution achieves
privacy by yielding nothing more than the result mˆ of the
computation on the user’s data {xi}.
Proof (Sketch). Following Lemma D.1, the encryption of the
user’s data {xi} yields a valid ciphertext ct that reveals
nothing about the underlying plaintext, due to the hardness
of the RLWE problem. By Lemma D.2, the BDOP commit-
ment scheme is statistically hiding, i.e., the noises used for
encryption are statistically hidden by Cbdop. According to
Lemma D.3, BDOP’s ⌃-protocol proves in zero-knowledge
that the committed encryption noises are in a bounded range,
thus not weakening the RLWE assumptions. As stated in [55],
the (2,3)-decomposition of C guarantees the privacy of its
inputs against quantum adversaries. The use of a fresh nonce
by the data source, when hashing the user’s messages {msgi},
ensures that the digests do not reveal any information about
the inputs. During the release phase, the privacy of the
computation’s output mˆ is protected by the binding property
of commitment C0 and the hiding property of commitment
C1 [55].
B. Integrity
Proposition V.2. Consider a series of messages {msgi}
certified by the data source with a digital signature scheme
 (·) that uses a cryptographic hash functionH(·) with nonces.
Assume that the parameters of the CKKS (N, q, enc, key, err)
and BDOP ( , k, n, q,N) schemes have been configured to
ensure post-quantum security, that the ZKB++ protocol exe-
cution of C achieves soundness , that the blinding function
B⌫,⌘ is hiding, and that the cryptographic commitment Com(·)
is hiding and binding. Then, our solution achieves integrity as
defined in Section II-C, as it ensures with soundness  that the
output mˆ is the result of the computation on the user’s data.
Proof (Sketch). Following Lemma D.1, the encryption of the
user’s data ct can be decrypted correctly. By applying
Lemma D.4 to our specific challenge space (see Section IV-B),
the BDOP commitment is statistically binding, thus, it is
infeasible for the user to claim the commitment for a set
of noises different than the employed one. As stated in
Lemma D.3, BDOP’s ⌃-protocol proves the small bound on
the encryption noises hence ensuring correct encryption with
soundness bound to the number of its iterations. According to
Proposition D.1 and [31], the ZKB++ protocol is a ⌃-protocol
and achieves 3-special soundness, thus yielding a valid witness
for the relation that the encryption noises were used to encrypt
the data that produce a specific salted hash. The number of
ZKB++ protocol iterations ⌧ is linked to the security parameter
by ⌧=d(log2 3  1) 1e. Finally, during the release protocol,
the integrity of the computation’s output mˆ is protected by the
hiding property of commitment C0, the hiding property of the
blinding function (seen as a one-time-pad shift cipher in Zq
which achieves perfect secrecy of ⌫·x, i.e., it is impossible for
the user to find ⌫ and blind another result as mˆB), and the
binding property of C1 [55].
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it ants to obtain. Then, the service provider ho o orphically
blinds ctψ by applying the function ν,η(x) ν·x η, ith ν
and η unifor ly sa pled in Z∗q and Zq resp., and co its
to the secret para eters used for blinding (i.e., ν, η) using
a hiding and binding cryptographic commitment Com(·) as
C0=Com(ν, η). A hash-based commitment scheme can be
used for this purpose [31]. Subsequently, the service provider
sends to the user the encrypted result ctψ , its blinding
Bν,η(ctψ), and the commitment C0. Upon reception, if the
user accepts the computation ψ(·), she decrypts both cipher-
texts as: Decsk(ctψ)=mˆ and Decsk(Bν,η(ctψ))=mˆB , and
verifies that mˆ matches the expected result of the computation.
If the user’s check succeeds, she commits to the decrypted
results, i.e., C1=Com(mˆ, mˆB), and communicates C1 to the
service provider who opens the commitment C0 to the user
(i.e., revealing ν, η). The user verifies that the initial blinding
was correct by checking if Bν,η(mˆ)
?
=mˆB . If this is the
case, she opens the commitment C1 (i.e., revealing mˆ, mˆB)
to the service provider who verifies that the cleartext result
matches the blinded information (i.e., by also checking if
Bν,η(mˆ)
?
=mˆB). At the end of the release phase, both parties
are confident that the decrypted output is the expected result
of the computation, whereas the service provider learns only
the computation’s result and nothing else about the user’s data.
V. PRIVACY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
CRISP protects the user’s privacy by revealing only the
output of the agreed computation on her data, and it protects
the service provider’s integrity by preventing any cheating or
forgery from the user. Here, we present an analysis of these
two properties providing sketches about their corresponding
proofs. The used lemmas and propositions as well as the full
proofs are presented in Appendix D.
A. Privacy
Proposition V.1. Consider a series of messages {msgi}
certified by the data source with a digital signature scheme
σ(·) that uses a cryptographic hash function H(·) with nonces.
Assume that the parameters of the CKKS (N, q, χenc, χkey, χerr)
and P (β, k, n, q, ) schemes have b en configured to
ensure post-quantum security, that the circuit C is a valid
(2,3)-deco position, and that the cryptographic commitment
o (·) is hiding and binding. Then, our solution achieves
privacy by yielding nothing more than the result mˆ of the
co putation on the user’s data {xi}.
roof (Sketch). Fo lowing Lemma D.1, the encryption of the
user’s data {xi} yields a valid ciphertext ct that reveals
nothing about the underlying plaintext, due to the hardne s
of the E proble . By Lemma D.2, the BDOP commit-
ent sche e is statistica ly hiding, i.e., the noises used for
encryption are statistica ly hidden by Cbdop. A cording to
e a .3, P’s Σ-protocol proves in zero-knowledge
that the co i ted encryption noises are in a bounded range,
thus not eakening the RL E a sumptions. As stated in [ 5],
the (2,3)-deco position of C guarant es the privacy of its
inputs against quantu adversaries. The use of a fresh nonce
by the data source, when hashing the user’s me sages {msgi},
ensures that the digests do not reveal any information about
the inputs. uring the release phase, the privacy of the
co putation’s output ˆ is protected by the binding property
of co it ent 0 and the hiding property of commitment
1 [55].
. Integrity
roposition .2. Consider a series of messages {msgi}
certified by the data source with a digital signature scheme
σ(·) that uses a cryptographic hash function H(·) with nonces.
Assu e that the parameters of the CKKS (N, q, χenc, χkey, χerr)
and B P (β, k, n, q, ) schemes have been configured to
ensure post-quantum security, that the ZKB++ protocol exe-
cution of C achieves soundness κ, that the blinding function
Bν,η is hiding, and that the cryptographic commitment Com(·)
is hiding and binding. Then, our solution achieves integrity as
defined in Section II-C, as it ensures with soundness κ that the
output mˆ is the result of the computation on the user’s data.
Proof (Sketch). Following Lemma D.1, the encryption of the
user’s data ct can be decrypted correctly. By applying
Lemma D.4 to our specific challenge space (see Section IV-B),
the BDOP commitment is statistically binding, thus, it is
infeasible for the user to claim the commitment for a set
of noises different than the employed one. As stated in
Lemma D.3, BDOP’s Σ-protocol proves the small bound on
the encryption noises hence ensuring correct encryption with
soundness bound to the number of its iterations. According to
Proposition D.1 and [31], the ZKB++ protocol is a Σ-protocol
and achieves 3-special soundness, thus yielding a valid witness
for the relation that the encryption noises were used to encrypt
the data that produce a specific salted hash. The number of
ZKB++ protocol iterations τ is linked to the security parameter
by τ=dκ(log2 3− 1)−1e. Finally, during the release protocol,
the integrity of the computation’s output mˆ is protected by the
hiding property of commitment C0, the hiding property of the
blinding function (seen as a one-time-pad shift cipher in Zq
which achieves perfect secrecy of ν·x, i.e., it is impossible for
the user to find ν and blind another result as mˆB), and the
binding property of C1 [55].
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VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate CRISP on the three uses-cases discussed in
Section I, namely smart metering, disease susceptibility,
and location-based activity tracking, using public real-world
datasets. We detail the instantiation and parameterization of
our proposed solution, then illustrate its overall performance
per use case, in terms of both overhead and utility. As
previously mentioned, CRISP enables to offload the data and
to conduct multiple operations on it. For simplicity, we present
only one operation per dataset.
A. Implementation Details
We detail how the various blocks of our construction are
implemented and configured.
Implementation. We implement the various blocks of
CRISP on top of different libraries. The homomorphic com-
putations are implemented using the Lattigo library [43].
The commitment and encryption blocks of the circuit are
implemented using CKKS from [88] by employing a ZKB++
approach. The circuit’s Boolean part (i.e., the hash and con-
version blocks) is implemented on top of the SHA-256 MPC-
in-the-head circuit of [55]. All the experiments are executed
on a modest Manjaro 4.19 virtual machine with an i5-8279U
processor running at 2,4 GHz with 8 GB RAM.
CKKS & BDOP. For CKKS, we use a Gaussian noise
distribution of standard deviation 3.2, ternary keys with i.i.d.
coefficients in {0,±1}N , and we choose q and N depending
on the computation and precision required for each use-case,
such that the achieved bit security is always at least 128 bits.
Each ciphertext encrypts a vector d consisting of the data
points {xi} in the series of messages {msgi}. Our three use-
cases need only computations over real numbers, hence we
extend the real vector to a complex vector with null imaginary
part. Similarly, the BDOP parameters for the commitment to
the encryption noises are use-case dependent. In principle, we
choose the smallest parameters n and k to ensure a 128-bit
security (n=1, k=5) and β is chosen according to N and q.
ZKB++. We set the security parameter κ to 128, which
corresponds to 219 iterations of the ZKB++ protocol. We also
consider seeds of size 128 bits and a commitment size of
|c|=256 bits using SHA-256 as in [31]. Overall, considering
the full circuit, the proof size per ZKB++ protocol iteration
|pi| is calculated as
|pi| = |c|+2κ+log2 3+
2
3
(|d|+|Com|+|Enc|+|t|)+bhash+bA2B,
with |d| being the bit size of the secret inputs, |Com| the
bit size of the commitment parameters, |Enc| the bit size of
the encryption parameters, bhash the number of multiplicative
gates in the SHA-256 circuit, bA2B the number of AND
gates in the conversion block, and |t| the bit size of the
additional information required to reconstruct the data source’s
message but not needed for the service provider’s computation
(e.g., user identifier, nonce, timestamps, etc.). We note that
according to the NIST specification [80], SHA-256 operates
by hashing data blocks of 447 bits. If the size of the user’s
input data exceeds this, it is split into chunks on which
the SHA-256 digest is evaluated iteratively, taking as initial
state the output of the previous chunk (see [80]). We adapt
the SHA-256 Boolean circuit described in [55], which uses
22,272 multiplication gates per hash block, to the setting
of ZKB++ [31]. The Boolean part of the circuit is focused
on the |x| least significant bits of the arithmetic sharing
of d which is concatenated locally with a Boolean secret
sharing of the additional information (nonce, uid, etc.). In our
implementation, the user needs 182 ms to run the Boolean part
of the circuit associated with generating a hash from a 32-bits
shared input x. The verifier needs 73 ms to verify this part of
the circuit.
Release Protocol. We use SHA-256 as a commitment scheme
Com(·) and a linear blinding operation Bν,η(·) in Zq .
Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate the performance of our
solution on different use-cases with varying complexity in
terms of computation (i.e., execution time) and communication
(i.e., proof size) overhead. The proof P is detailed as the
proof for the ZKCE, as well as the BDOP bound proof. We
also report the optimal ZKCE proof size per datapoint: i.e.,
if the ciphertexts are fully packed. To cover a wide range
of applications we evaluate various types of operations on
the protected data such as additions, weighted sums, as well
as a polynomial approximation of the non-linear Euclidean
distance computation. As CKKS enables approximate arith-
metic, we measure the accuracy of our solution by using the
relative error. Given the true output of a computation m and
the (approximate) value mˆ computed with CRISP, the relative
error ε is defined as ε = m−mˆm .
B. Smart Metering
We consider a smart meter that monitors the household’s
electricity consumption and signs data points containing a
fresh nonce, the household identifier, the timestamp, and its
consumption. The energy authority is interested in estimating
the total household consumption (i.e., the sum over the con-
sumption data points) over a specified time period I (e.g., a
month or a year) for billing purposes
msm =
∑
i∈I
d[i],
where d is the vector of the household consumption per half
hour. As our solution offloads the encrypted data to the service
provider, additional computations, e.g., statistics about the
household’s consumption, are possible without requiring a new
proof; this improves flexibility for the service provider.
Dataset & Experiment Setup. We use the publicly available
and pre-processed UKPN dataset [3] that contains the per half
hour (phh) consumption of thousands of households in London
between November 2011 and February 2014. Each entry in
the dataset comprises a household identifier, a timestamp,
and its consumption phh. For our experiment, we randomly
sample a subset of 1,035 households and estimate their total
energy consumption over the time span of the dataset with our
solution. We set the parameters as follows: We use a modulus
of log q=45 bits and a precision of 25 bits, which imposes
a maximum of 210 slots for the input vectors (logN=11).
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(a) Smart Metering
(Addition)
(b) Disease Susceptibility
(Weighted Sum)
(c) Location-based Activity
Tracking (Euclidean Distance)
Figure 4: Histogram and boxplot of the relative error for the three use cases. The boxes shown on top of each figure represent
the interquartile range (IQ) and the median, the whiskers are quartiles ±1.5·IQ, and the dots are outliers.
Hence, each household’s consumption phh is encoded with
multiple vectors dk to cover the time span of the dataset. To
evaluate its proof size, we assume that the messages obtained
from the smart meter include a 16-bit household id, a 128-bit
nonce, a 32-bit timestamp, and a 16-bit consumption entry.
Results. The average time for encryption of a vector of
1,024 datapoints at the user side is tenc=65.6 ms, and the
decryption requires tdec=0.7 ms. The mean time for the energy
computation at the service provider side is tcomp=126.7 ms.
To generate the proof for one ciphertext, containing 1,024 phh
measurements (i.e., 21 days worth of data), the user requires
tprove=3.3 min, and its verification at the service provider’s
side is executed in tver=1.4 min. The estimated ZKCE proof
size for each ciphertext of 1,024 elements is 643.4 MB,
whereas the bound proof is 7.05 MB. This is acceptable in
an offline setting with a modern internet connection: with
a 100 Mb/s link the transfer of all 1,024 datapoints would
require less than a minute and could be done when the user is
idle. For fully packed ciphertexts (1,024 datapoints), CRISP’s
proof generation and verification respectively take 195 ms and
80 ms per datapoint, with a communication of 628 KB. Finally,
Figure 4a displays the accuracy results for the smart metering
use-case. We observe that our solution achieves an average
absolute relative error of 5.1·10−5 with a standard deviation
of 7.2·10−5, i.e., it provides very good accuracy for energy
consumption computations. We remark that more than 75%
of the households have an error less than ±2.5·10−4.
C. Disease Susceptibility
We assume a medical center that sequences a patient’s
genome and certifies batches of single nucleotide polymor-
phisms (SNPs) that are associated with a particular disease dis.
A privacy conscious direct-to-consumer service is interested
in estimating the user’s susceptibility mˆdis to that disease by
calculating the following normalized weighted sum
mdis =
∑
i∈Sdis
ωi · d[i],
where Sdis is the set of SNPs associated with dis and ωi
are their corresponding weights. The vector d comprises of
values in {0, 1, 2} indicating the presence of a SNP in 0,
1, or both chromosomes, which can be represented by two
bits. This use case illustrates the need for flexibility in the
service provider’s computations, since it may be required to
evaluate several diseases on the same input data at different
times. Moreover, it accentuates the need for resistance against
quantum adversaries, since genomic data is both immutable
and highly sensitive over generations.
Dataset & Experiment Setup. We employ the 1,000 Genomes
public dataset [1], that contains the genomic sequences of
a few thousands of individuals from various populations.
We randomly sample 145 individuals and extract 869 SNPs
related to five diseases: Alzheimer’s, bipolar disorder, breast
cancer, type-2 diabetes, and Schizophrenia. We obtain the
weight of a SNP with respect to those diseases from the
GWAS Catalog [23]. Then, for every individual, we estimate
their susceptibility to each disease. For this use case, we
use a precision log p=25, a modulus of log q=56 consumed
over two levels and a polynomial degree of logN=12. The
input vector d (consisting of 211 slots) is an ordered vector
of integers containing the SNP values, coded on two bits,
associated with the diseases. One vector is sufficient for the
considered diseases. To estimate the proof size, we assume
that the message signed by the data source contains a 16-bit
user identifier, a 128-bit nonce, and the whole block of SNPs.
Results. The average encryption time for up to 2,048 SNPs
at the user side is tenc=60.3 ms, and the decryption is
tdec=2.7 ms. The computation time of the disease suscepti-
bility at the service provider is tcomp=22.4 ms. The user needs
tprove=26.2 s to generate the proof for the arithmetic part of the
circuit, and the service provider verifies it in tver=13.3 s. The
estimated proof size for the ZKCE is 36.6 MB, whereas the
bound proof is 17.3 MB. Figure 4b shows our construction’s
accuracy for disease susceptibility computations by plotting
the distribution of the relative error. We remark that the
mean absolute relative error for such computations is appre-
ciably low: 2.2·10−5 on average with a standard deviation of
2.3·10−5. Moreover, more that 75% of the evaluated records
have an absolute error inside the range ±0.7·10−4.
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Use Case Computation Mean AbsoluteRelative Error tenc tcomp tdec
Proof
Size (MB)
tprove tver
Smart Metering Sum 5.1 · 10−5 65.6 ms 126.7 ms 0.7 ms 650.5 3.3 min 1.4 min
Disease Susceptibility Weighted Sum 2.2 · 10−5 60.3 ms 22.4 ms 2.7 ms 53.9 26.2 s 13.3 s
Location-Based Activity
Tracking
Euclidean
Distance 1.5 · 10−2 982.2 ms 176.4 ms 7.0 ms 1, 603 7.9 min 3.4 min
Table I: Evaluation summary of CRISP (timings are averaged over 50 runs).
D. Location-Based Activity Tracking
We assume that a user is running with a wearable device
that retrieves her location points during the activity from a
data source, e.g., a cellular network. The service provider, e.g.,
an online fitness social network, seeks to estimate the total
distance that the user ran during her activity I:
mrun =
∑
i∈I
√
(d[i+1]−d[i])2+(d[N
4
+i+1]−d[N
4
+i])2,
with d the vector of UTM (Universal Transverse Mercator)
inputs packing Eastings in the first half of the vector and
Northings in the second. Given that Euclidean distance com-
putations require the evaluation of a non-linear square root
function, we consider its least-squares approximation by a
degree seven polynomial on a Legendre polynomial base.
Dataset & Experiment Setup. We run our experiment on
a public dataset from Garmin Connect [63]. This dataset
contains GPS traces of thousands of users engaging in various
activities such as walking, running, and cycling. We randomly
sample 2,000 running traces and we discard traces with less
than 15 points and more than 2,000 points. Our initial dataset
analysis shows that the traces are very noisy: we identified un-
realistic distances between consecutive points, timestamps and
locations. We use GPSBabel [75], an open-source software, to
interpolate the running traces such that the following criteria
are met: (a) the maximum speed of a runner is less than 10 m/s,
(b) the maximum distance between consecutive points is less
than 30 m, and (c) the time delta between two points is less
than 3 s, which are realistic for running activities. We remove
traces whose time sampling was improperly executed by the
data source (difference more than 10 s, standard deviation more
than 5, or a zero inter-quartile at 75%), as well as traces with
unacceptable idleness1, and we convert the remaining GPS
traces to UTM to obtain the Northings and Eastings geographic
coordinates. Overall, we obtain a dataset of 1,608 traces (80%
of the initial 2K running trace dataset) on which we estimate
their total distance with CRISP.
Considering the polynomial approximation required for the
square root function, we set the size of the polynomial ring
N=213 and a modulus log q=184. To calculate the proof
sizes, we assume that the messages obtained from the data
source contain a 16-bit user identifier, a 128-bit nonce, a 32-
bit timestamp, and 24-bit Easting/Northing coordinates.
Results. The encryption and decryption overhead for fully
packed ciphertexts of up to 2,048 points at the user side
1Idleness of a trace is a situation where the interquartile at 25% of the
instant speed is less than 0.3m/s and the covered distance is less than 15 m.
is tenc=982.2 ms and tdec=7.0 ms, respectively, and the Eu-
clidean distance computation at the service provider requires
tcomp=176.4 ms. For 2,048 datapoints, the user generates the
proof for the arithmetic part of the circuit in tprove=7.9 min,
and the service provider verifies it in tver=3.4 min. Considering
that each message signed by the data source is 96-bits, the
proof size per trace for the ZKCE is 1, 499.2 MB, and the
bound proof is 103.7 MB. In Section VI-E, we will show
how to reduce this proof size. With fully packed ciphertexts,
CRISP’s proof generation requires 231 ms per datapoint and
101 ms for its verification, at a communication cost of 732 KB.
Finally, Figure 4c plots the relative error that we achieve for
Euclidean distance computations. In particular, the average
absolute relative error is 1.5·10−2 with a standard deviation
of 2.3·10−2. On Figure 4c, we see that more than 75% of the
evaluated traces have an absolute error between ±0.04. We
observe how the square root approximation introduces errors
higher than the other use cases — the wider spread of the
relative error is due to the variance of the datapoints. Indeed,
our analysis shows that gait, time sampling, and skewness of
the speed distribution are among the factors that influence the
overall relative error of the computations.
E. Reducing the Communication Overhead
Table I summarizes CRISP ’s overhead for three use-cases:
smart metering, disease susceptibility, and location-based ac-
tivity tracking. We observe that it introduces acceptable com-
putational overhead at the user and service provider sides
and that it achieves average absolute relative error between
2.2·10−5 and 0.015 for the desired computations. We re-
mark however that our construction uses post-quantum secure
lattice-based cryptographic primitives, such as encryption and
commitment, and the MPC-in-the-head approach, to ensure the
integrity of the user’s data transfer. These come at the price
of an increased communication (i.e., proof size). Therefore,
we propose several improvements that one could employ to
reduce this overhead.
Random Integrity Checks. A first optimization is to reduce
the number of data points whose integrity is checked by the
service provider. This introduces a trade-off between CRISP ’s
security level and its communication overhead. In particular,
a service provider can decide to check only a subset of the
input data hashes in the data verification phase, as we assume
malicious but rational users (Section II-B) who will not cheat
if there is a significant probability of getting caught. Such
a strategy enables a service provider to tune the solution
depending on the level of confidence it has in the user. Figure 5
plots the estimated proof size for the ZKCE with respect to the
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Figure 5: ZKCE proof size (MB) for fully packed cipherexts
vs. the maximum probability of cheating for the smart meter-
ing and location-based activity tracking use cases.
users’ maximum probability of cheating (i.e., the proportion of
data blocks the user can tamper with without getting caught)
for two use cases, namely, smart metering and location-based
activity tracking (we consider only these two use cases in this
optimization section). Overall, we observe how the proof size
decreases as the maximum probability of cheating increases.
We note that if the service provider checks 20% of the data
blocks in the verification phase, the proof size for location-
based activity tracking (blue line) drops from 1, 499.2 MB to
497 MB (i.e., 243 KB/datapoint), whereas for smart metering
(green circled line) it decreases from 643.4 MB to 142.2 MB
(i.e., 139 KB/datapoint). This yields a reduction of more than
66% in the total ZKCE communication overhead. Computation
times to generate and verify the proofs are also more than
halved.
Batching. Another improvement is to modify the way data
sources certify the users’ data points. So far, in the smart
metering and location-based activity tracking use-cases, we
assumed that data sources hash and sign every data point gen-
erated by the user. However, another strategy is to hash batches
of data points in a single signed message. This modification is
purely operational as it does not require additional software or
hardware deployment. We set the batch size depending on the
use case – i.e., considering the additional information of each
message before signature – such that the overall batch can fit
on a single SHA-256 input block of 447 bits. Figure 5 shows
the reduction in proof size for the smart metering and location-
based activity tracking use cases when batching is employed.
For smart metering (red circled dotted line), the ZKCE proof
size is further reduced to 38.1 MB (i.e., 37.2 KB/datapoint),
whereas for the location-based activity tracking (orange dotted
line) the proof size drops to 329.7 MB (i.e., 161 KB/datapoint),
when 20% of the data blocks are verified. For activity-tracking,
the computation time to generate the proof is reduced to
2.1 min and 1.1 min to verify it (61 and 32 ms per datapoint,
resp.). For smart metering, the proof generation time becomes
20 s, and the verification one 9.3 s (20 and 9 ms per datapoint,
resp.).
ZKCE Pre-processing. Finally, one can employ a ZKCE pre-
processing model, such as that presented by Katz et al. [66].
The pre-processing model considers that the user executes
offline a series of circuit evaluations on committed values. The
service provider challenges a subset M of those evaluations
and checks their integrity, and the remaining τ ones are used in
an online phase along with the committed values. The rest of
the protocol is similar to ZKB++. The proof size per iteration
is reduced to:
|pi|=2κ+ τ log2
M
τ
3κ+
τ(κ log2 3+2κ+(|d|+|Com|+|Enc|+|t|)+2(bhash+bA2B)).
Regarding our three players setting, a 128-bit security level
requires M=300 and τ=81, yielding a significant reduction
on the proof size (see [66] for the computation details). For
instance, for smart metering, the ZKCE proof is reduced from
38.1 MB to 26.8 MB. Similarly, for location-based activity
tracking, the ZKCE proof becomes 203.0 MB instead of
329.7 MB. This yields optimal ZKCE proof size per datapoint
of 26.2 KB and 99.1 KB for smart metering and activity-
tracking, respectively. Finally, we remark that according to
Katz et al. [66], a trade-off between proof size and prover’s
computations could be achieved by increasing the number of
players involved in the MPC-in-the-head protocol. However,
such an improvement would require additional changes in
CRISP, e.g., the conversion block that interfaces the arithmetic
and Boolean parts of the circuit should be adapted for a larger
number of players.
F. Comparison with ADSNARK
A fair comparison with [13] is not trivial to achieve, as
our solution provides post-quantum security and overcomes
the constraint of a trusted setup. Nonetheless, here we pro-
vide hints of their qualitative and quantitative differences. In
particular, ADSNARK considers a smart metering use-case
that requires a non-linear cumulative function for the billing
analysis over a month of data. We consider a similar non-linear
pricing function evaluated by a degree-two polynomial, and we
evaluate CRISP on the UKPN dataset for 400 households, with
N=12 and log q=106. The median accuracy of our solution is
higher than 99%. In terms of proof size, our construction yields
889.2 MB (verifying all phh measurements for a month),
whereas the overhead induced by ADSNARK is 71 MB.
However, we remark that the latter requires a new proof to be
generated and exchanged every time a different computation
is needed. In our solution, this cost is incurred only once;
any subsequent operations can be computed locally by the
service provider on the verified data. Additionally, ADSNARK
accounts for only a “theoretical estimate” of the complexity
of the signature circuit (with only 1K multiplicative gates for
signature verification) and, if we were to evaluate our solution
with this circuit, the proof size would be only 104.2 MB. Thus,
our analysis shows that our construction offers comparable
results to the state-of-the-art and provides stronger security
guarantees.
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VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we present some interesting considerations
that could influence the deployment of our solution.
Signature Scheme. As discussed in Section IV-A, CRISP is
agnostic of the digital signature and it is compatible with
any scheme that uses the SHA-256 hash function. We employ
SHA-256 as it is widely deployed in current infrastructures,
adopted by various signature schemes (e.g., the recent post-
quantum SPHINCS [19] or the standard ECDSA schemes),
and it is a benchmark for the evaluation of ZKBoo [55]
and ZKB++ [31]. This flexibility enables CRISP to be compli-
ant with currently deployed signature schemes that might not
be quantum resistant (e.g., ECDSA) at the cost of CRISP’s
post-quantum integrity property. Working with other hash
functions (e.g., SHA-3 that is employed in [31]) is possible,
with modifications to CRISP’s circuit.
Integrity Attacks. CRISP copes with malicious users that
might attempt to modify their data or the computed result
to their benefit. However, some use cases require accounting
for additional threats. For example, for smart metering, users
might purposefully fail to report some data (i.e., misreport) to
reduce their billing costs. Similarly, in location-based activity-
tracking, users might re-use pieces of data certified by the data
source to claim higher performance and increase their benefits
(i.e., double report). Such attacks can be thwarted by system
level decisions; e.g., data sources can generate data points
at fixed time-intervals known to service providers. Message
timestamps can be encrypted along with the data points, so
that service providers can verify their properties (e.g., their
order or their range). As those attacks are application specific,
we consider them out of the scope of this work.
Security of the ZKCE. Dinur and Nadler [42] unveil a vul-
nerability of ZKCE systems, such as ZKB++, to multi-target
attacks on the pseudo-random number generators. However,
as stated by the authors, these attacks require a very large
number of MPC protocol executions thus are impractical and
out of scope for our construction. The authors also argue that
the use of appropriate salting in the pseudo-random number
generation renders the attack very hard to succeed.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Although homomorphic encryption is a solution receiving
much traction to protect privacy in various fields, such as ma-
chine learning [57], [65], [87] and medical research [67], [93],
it only addresses the tension between privacy and utility, and
it does not account for the authenticity of the encrypted data
nor the correctness of the computation of its encryption (i.e.,
integrity). Verifiable encryption (VE) enables us to efficiently
prove properties on encrypted data. Although VE solutions
have been widely explored in the general case, notably by
Camenish et al. [24], [25], they are still under investigation for
lattice-based cryptographic systems that provide post-quantum
security. Lyubashevsky and Neven [78] propose a one-shot
verifiable encryption for short solutions to linear relations,
i.e., a single run of their protocol convinces a verifier that the
plaintext satisfies the relation. Recent improvements, e.g., [16]
and [46], expand lattice-based VE to non-linear polynomial
relations. Although VE can be used for proofs of correct
encryption, it does not address data authenticity, which is
ensured by cryptographic techniques, such as hash functions,
that are more complex than polynomial relations.
To this end, homomorphic signatures [21], [26], [28], [56]
and homomorphic authenticators [6], [48], [54], [86] enable
privacy-preserving computations on authenticated data. In par-
ticular, such schemes produce a signature of the plaintext
result of homomorphic computations without deciphering.
In this setting, a data owner provides a signature to some
protected data and sends it to a server for processing. The
server generates a new valid signature for the result of the
homomorphic computation, which yields nothing more than
the message it is signing. Some works, e.g., [6], improve this
area with constructions offering homomorphic signatures that
cope with low-degree polynomial operations. Homomorphic
authenticators could be a solution to the problem under investi-
gation, but they (a) require data sources to employ non-widely-
supported homomorphic signature schemes, thus violating the
minimal infrastructure modification requirement of our model,
and (b) do not support data offloading at the service provider
to amortize communication and storage costs.
Verifiable computation (VC) [47], [51], [69] typically ap-
plies to cases where a computationally weak user transfers her
encrypted data to a cloud provider that computes on it, and
its objective is to ensure the correctness and trustworthiness of
the result. As such, VC protects only the integrity of the cloud
computations and not the authenticity of the user’s provided
data. Such techniques are orthogonal to CRISP and could be
employed to enable users to verify the computations performed
by service providers, if the latter are considered malicious
(and not honest-but-curious as in our Threat Model – see
Section II-B).
Other VC techniques, known as zero-knowledge arguments,
enable us to prove general statements about user private
inputs. Pinocchio [83] and subsequent works on succinct non-
interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKS), e.g., [38],
build on Quadratic Arithmetic Programs [52] and bilinear
maps to provide efficient proofs with small verification com-
plexity. Backes et al. [13] extend SNARKS to the case of certi-
fied data (ADSNARK) and apply them to the three party model
considered in this work. Similarly, ZQL [49] and Z∅ [50]
present languages and compilers for data certification, client
side computation, and result verification. But those solutions
require computations from the user every time a new query is
performed, thus not supporting data offloading. Furthermore,
as pointed out by Katz et al. [66], SNARKS suffer from
one or both of the following problems: (a) they require a
trusted set-up, and (b) they are insecure against quantum
attacks (due to the use of bilinear maps [83], [38], [13], [49],
[50]). Interestingly, this holds also for the recent work of
Gennaro et al. [53]; they use LWE homomorphic encryption
to achieve post-quantum security of their encodings, but still
rely on trusted setups through common reference strings [39]
and q-PKE [58] assumptions. This trusted setup constraint is
addressed by Wahby et al. [92], but their solution relies on
the discrete log problem that is de facto not post-quantum
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secure. Finally, Ben-Sasson et al. [18] propose STARKs which
achieve transparent and scalable arguments of knowledge by
relying only on the collision-resistant hash and Fiat-Shamir
heuristic assumptions. Although STARK-like systems solve a
similar problem to ours, they follow a different approach where
the bulk of the work is executed at the user side and no data
offloading is considered, hence, multiple data computations
require the creation of multiple proofs.
A radically different approach to proving statements in zero-
knowledge comprises solutions based on multi-party compu-
tation (MPC) such as ZKBoo [55], ZKB++ [31], Ligero [7],
and KKW [66]. These solutions are built on top of the MPC-
in-the-head paradigm introduced by Ishai et al. [64] and
provide plausibly post-quantum secure mechanisms to prove
the knowledge of an input to a public circuit that yields a
specific output, due to a cut-and-choose approach over several
runs. Our construction follows this approach to convince the
service provider about the integrity of the user’s data and
its encryption. In a concurrent work [17], Baum and Nof
also present the use of MPC-in-the-head to prove lattice-
based assumptions. However, their construction is based on
a different problem (SIS, Short Integer Solution) and, unlike
CRISP, does not address the integrity check of the encrypted
payload.
Another potential solution for enabling privacy-friendly and
integrity preserving computations on authenticated data is
to consider trusted hardware, such as Intel SGX [8], [62],
[79], to process the data at the user side. This would make
the trusted hardware act as a data source that processes the
data and returns a signed result to the service provider, thus
guaranteeing data and computation integrity. However, this
would violate our objective of seamless integration at the user
side, as it requires modification at the hardware level, and it
would introduce additional trust assumptions.
Several works are devoted to protecting privacy for smart
metering (e.g., see surveys [44], [94]). However, only some of
them, e.g., [5], [73], address also the concern of data integrity
and authenticity, by relying on custom homomorphic signature
schemes. The applicability of such solutions is limited as,
according to their technical specifications [89], smart meters
cope with standard digital signatures, e.g., ECDSA [81].
Similarly, a number of works, e.g., [12], [41], [93], employ
homomorphic encryption to protect genomic privacy and to
perform disease-susceptibility computations. Their model con-
siders a medical unit that sequences the DNA of the user,
who in turn protects it via homomorphic encryption before
sending it for processing to a third-party. These solutions do
not address the issue of data integrity or authenticity. Finally,
several works are dedicated to both privacy and integrity in
location-based activity tracking [96], [95], [77], [84], [85],
[60]. They also are either peer-based [96], [95], infrastructure-
based [77], [84], or hybrid[85], [60]. SecureRun [84] offers
activity proofs for estimating the distance covered in a privacy
and integrity preserving manner. Nevertheless, the system’s
accuracy relies on the density of access points, and it achieves
at best a median accuracy of 78% (compared to 99.9% with
CRISP on a similar dataset).
IX. CONCLUSION
Data sharing among users and service providers in the
digital era incurs a trade-off between privacy, integrity, and
utility. In this paper, we have proposed a generic solution
that protects the interests of both users and service providers.
Building on state-of-the-art lattice-based homomorphic en-
cryption and commitments, as well as zero-knowledge proofs,
our construction enables users to offload their data to service
providers in a post-quantum secure, privacy and integrity
preserving manner, yet still enables flexible computations on
it. We evaluated our solution on three different uses cases,
showing its wide potential for adoption.
For future direction, we will consider further reducing the
communication overhead by including more players in the
MPC-in-the-head protocol [66], which requires the design of a
novel bit-decomposition conversion block that supports more
than three players.
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APPENDIX A: ZKB++
(2,3)-decomposition of a Circuit from [55], [31] For
a one-way function f represented by a circuit C, a
(2,3)-decomposition consists of a series of algorithms
(SHARE,OUTPUT,REC) ∪ UPDATE, with SHARE surjective,
and allows to create three separate views of the circuit. Then,
ZKB++ enables to prove knowledge of a secret input x such
that f(x) = y, with y the publicly known output. For an
iteration k, the views for player i is denoted by a vector
Viewki ={view0i , · · ·, viewNgi }.
• The SHARE algorithm splits a secret x:(
view01, view
0
2, view
0
3
)
= SHARE(x,k1,k2,k3),
with ki being a random tape, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
• F =
Ng⋃
i=1
{φj1, φj2, φj2}, where Ng is the number of gates
in C and φji is the j-th gate of player i.
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Figure 6: (2,3)-decomposition of a circuit.
• The UPDATE algorithm evaluates the gates into the views:
viewj+1i =φ
j
i (view
j
i , view
j
i+1,ki,ki+1),
where j ∈ [0, Ng − 1],∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
• The OUTPUT algorithm returns the output wires:
yi=OUTPUT(view
Ng
i ),∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
• REC reconstructs the output: y=REC(y1, y2, y3).
The intermediary functions φji are defined by running a
linear decomposition on C such that:
• Each player i has wire wi and w(1)k +w
(2)
k +w
(3)
k is equal
to the wire state of the k-th gate of C.
• Addition by a constant d: ∀i∈{1, 2, 3}
w
(i)
b =
{
w
(i)
a + d if i = 1,
w
(i)
a otherwise.
• Multiplication by a constant d: ∀i∈{1, 2, 3}
w
(i)
b = d · w(i)a .
• Binary addition: ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
w(i)c = w
(i)
a + w
(i)
b .
• Binary multiplication: ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
w(i)c = w
(i)
a ·w(i)b +w(i+1)a ·w(i)b +w(i)a ·w(i+1)b +Ri(c)−Ri+1(c),
where Ri(c) is the c-th output of a pseudo-random
generator seeded with ki.
The 2-privacy property ensures that revealing two views (i.e.,
opening two players) does not leak information about the
witness. Overall, the ZKB++ protocol works as follows:
(i) The prover emulates three players. For each iteration
i ∈ [1, t], each player j ∈ {0, 1, 2} evaluates the (2,3)-
decomposition of the circuit and:
– commits to:[
C
(i)
j , D
(i)
j
]
←
[
H
(
k
(i)
j , x
(i)
j ,View
i
j
)
, k
(i)
j ‖Viewij
]
,
– and lets a(i) =
(
y
(i)
1 , y
(i)
2 , y
(i)
3 , C
(i)
1 , C
(i)
2 , C
(i)
3
)
.
(ii) The prover computes the challenge e = H
(
a(1), . . ., a(t)
)
and reads it as a value e(i)∈{1, 2, 3}, for all i∈[1, t]. For
all i∈[1, t], the prover lets b(i) =
(
y
(i)
e(i)+2
, C
(i)
e(i)+2
)
and
z(i) ←

(
View(i)2 ,ki1,ki2
)
if e(i) = 1,(
View(i)3 ,k
(i)
2 ,k
(i)
3 , x
(i)
3
)
if e(i) = 2,(
View(i)1 ,k
(i)
3 ,k
(i)
1 , x
(i)
3
)
if e(i) = 3.
(iii) Then, the prover computes the proof
p=
[
e,
(
b(1), z(1)
)
,
(
b(2), z(2)
)
, · · ·,
(
b(t), z(t)
)]
.
(iv) The verifier, for each iteration i ∈ [1, t], reconstructs the
input and output views that were not given as part of the
proof by:
– running the circuit for player ei with the information
in the proof, and
– computing Cij , D
i
j , and a
i, with the information pro-
vided in bi.
(v) Finally, the verifier computes the challenge
e′=H
(
a(1), . . ., a(t)
)
and checks that e ?=e′ is true.
APPENDIX B: OTHER USES CASES
As discussed in Section I, the considered three-party model
is generic enough to accommodate various use cases where si-
multaneously protecting privacy and integrity is of paramount
importance. For instance, in business auditing, a company (i.e.,
the user) may have its financial books certified by a legal entity
responsible for it, e.g., the director of the financial department
(i.e., the data source) and a third-party auditing entity (i.e.,
the service provider) verifies their correctness in a privacy-
preserving manner [13]. Loyalty programs constitute another
use case that can be covered by the envisioned model. In this
setting, customers of retailers obtain certifications about their
purchases from payment terminals installed in shops by a bank
and, to obtain discounts, use the certified data with the retailer
[20]. Similarly, in personalized health applications, wearable
devices act as data sources that sign users’ blood pressure,
heart rate, or quality of sleep. These data can be used with
service providers that perform machine-learning operations to
predict the user’s health status and provide recommendations.
Finally, other location-based activities, such as pay-as-you-
drive insurance or dynamic road tolling [14], are very similar
to the location-based activity tracking case we evaluated in
our work.
In Table II, we present the parties involved in the various
use cases discussed in Section I.
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Use Case Data Source Service Provider
Smart Metering Smart Meter
Energy Company
billing and load
balancing entities
Disease Susceptibility
Test
Medical Unit or
Sequencing Center
direct-to-consumer /
pharmaceutical
companies
Location-Based
Activity Tracking Cellular Network
Social Networks,
Insurance Companies,
etc.
Dynamic Road
Tolling Cellular Network Tolling Company
Pay-as-you-drive
Insurance Cellular Network Insurance Company
Business Auditing Head of FinancialDep. Auditing Company
Loyalty Program Payment Terminal Retailer
Table II: Other examples of use cases.
APPENDIX C: BOUND PROOF OF BDOP COMMITMENTS
Consider a given a commitment c = BDOP(m, rc) of a
single input value m. The BDOP commitment scheme [15]
enables the prover to claim that the norm of m is small through
a bound proof. The protocol works as follows:
1) The prover computes a commitment t = BDOP(µ,ρ) for
µ sampled uniformly in Rq and ρ∈Slcβ a valid commit-
ment noise subjected to ‖µ‖∞ ≤ βµ and ‖ρ‖∞ ≤ βρ.
Then, the prover commits to this commitment through
an auxiliary commitment and sends caux=Caux(t) to the
verifier.
2) The verifier randomly picks and sends a challenge
d∈{0, 1}.
3) The prover checks the correctness of the challenge and
computes z=µ + dm as well as rz=ρ + drc in order
to provide a valid opening of t+dc. The prover aborts
if the resulting commitment is not properly formatted.
Otherwise, it sends z, rz , and the opening of the auxiliary
commitment to the verifier.
4) The verifier checks the correctness of the opening and
that the norm of z is small.
At the end of the protocol, the verifier is ensured that the
norm of the secret m is below a specific threshold. This
protocol can be made non interactive with the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic and iterated to increase the soundness. We refer the
reader to [15] for more details.
APPENDIX D: PROOF, PROPOSITIONS, AND LEMMAS
For the sake of completeness, and for the reader’s conve-
nience, we present here the lemmas and propositions used
in Section V to support the privacy and security analysis of
our solution. The full details about the proofs sketched in
Sections V-A and V-B are provided in Appendices D-A and
D-B, respectively.
Lemma D.1 (Lemma 1 in CKKS [35]). The encryption
noise is bounded by Bclean=8
√
2σN+6σ
√
N+16σ
√
hN . If
c←Encpk(m) and m←Ecd(z,∆) for some z∈Z[i]N/2 and
∆>N+2Bclean, then Dcd(Decsk(c))=z.
Ecd(., .) (resp. Dcd(.)) is the encoding (resp. decoding) func-
tion with scaling factor ∆, and h is the Hamming weight of
the secret key.
Lemma D.2 (Lemma 4 in BDOP [15]). Assume the distribu-
tion D and that Rq , m are chosen such that: 1) the min-entropy
of a vector drawn from D is at least (k + 1) log |Rq|+κ,
where κ is a (statistical) security parameter, and 2) the
class of functions {fa|a∈Rmq } where fa(r)=a · r is universal
when mapping the support of D to Rq . Then, the scheme is
statistically hiding.
Recall that D denotes the distribution of an honest provers
randomness for commitments.
Lemma D.3 (Lemma 10 in BDOP [15]). The protocol ΠBound
has the following properties:
• Correctness: The verifier always accepts an honest
prover when the protocol does not abort. The probability
of abort is at most 2/γ + 2/γx.
• Special soundness: On input a commitment c
and a pair of transcripts (c, d, (caux, t, z, rz)),
(c, d′, (c′aux, t
′, z′, r′z)) where d6=d′, we can extract
either a witness for breaking the auxiliary commitment
scheme, or a valid opening of c where the message x
has norm at most γxNβx.
• Honest-verifier zero-knowledge: Executions of protocol
ΠBound with an honest verifier can be simulated with
statistically indistinguishable distribution.
We remind that γ is a constant that regulates the abort
probability, γx a constant piloting the norm of z, and βx an
upper bound on the norm of possible x.
Lemma D.4 (Lemma 3 in BDOP [15]). From a commitment
c and correct openings r, f , r′, f ′ to two different message
vectors x, x′, one can efficiently compute a solution s with
‖s‖∞ ≤ 2Nmγβγ2D to the Ring-SIS problem instance defined
by the top row of A1.
Proposition D.1 (Proposition 4.2 in ZKBoo [55]). The ZKBoo
protocol is a Σ-protocol for the relation RΦ with 3-special
soundness.
A. Privacy
We present a proof of Proposition V.1 about the pri-
vacy guarantees of CRISP following the real/ideal simulation
paradigm [74]. In particular, our proof is based on constructing
an ideal simulator whose outputs are indistinguishable from
the real outputs of CRISP ’s transfer and release phases.
Transfer Phase. In the quantum random oracle model
(QROM), consider an ideal-world simulator St and any cor-
rupted probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) service provider
(i.e., the verifier). Without loss of generality, we consider
only one round of communication between the user and
service provider (i.e., one set of challenges). The simulator
St generates a public-private key pair (pk′, sk′). Following
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the encryption protocol, St samples uniformly at random
r′0 ← χenc and e′0, e′1 ← χerr and computes the encryption
of a random vector m′ into ct′. Similarly, it samples a
commitment noise vector r′c ← Skβ and commits (r′0, e′0, e′1)
into C ′bdop. Using a random nonce, the simulator also hashes
H(m′[0]). Without loss of generality, this can be extended to
all components of m′. St then sends {ct′,C ′bdop, H(m′[0])}
to the service provider. The view of the service provider in the
real protocol comprises {ct,Cbdop, H(msg)}. By the semantic
security of the underlying encryption scheme, the hiding
property of the BDOP commitment scheme (see Lemma D.2),
and the indistinguishability property of the hash function in the
QROM, the simulated view is indistinguishable from the real
view.
Concurrently, following the proof of Lemma D.3 in [15],
for each iteration of the bound proof with challenge d∈{0, 1},
the simulator St randomly draws z′ and r′z subject to
‖z′‖∞ ≤ γxNβx/2 and ‖r′z‖∞ ≤ (γNm/2)β and sets
t=BDOP(z′, r′z)−dCbdop. The simulator then commits to t
in the bound proof protocol. Both ideal and real distributions
are indistinguishable by the hiding property of the auxiliary
commitment.
In parallel, following [55], given e ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the simulator
St sequentially
• Evaluates the SHARE function on the vector m′, the
encryption noises e′0, e
′
1, and r
′
0 and commitment noises
r′c. We denote the result by (view
′0
1, view
′0
2, view
′0
3).
• Samples random tapes k′e, k
′
e+1.
• Evaluates the arithmetic circuit according to: If gate c is
linear, it defines view′ce and view
′c
e+1 using φ
c
e and φ
c
e+1.
If gate c is a multiplication one, it samples uniformly at
random view′ce+1 and uses φ
c
e to compute view
′c
e.
• Once all the gates are evaluated and the vectors of
views View′e and View
′
e+1 are defined (see App. A), the
simulator computes the respective outputs y′e and y
′
e+1.
• Computes y′e+2 = y − (y′e + y′e+1).
• Computes z′e following step (ii) of the ZKB++ protocol
using View′e+1, k′e, k′e+1 (and optionally x′e+2 depending
on the challenge).
• Outputs (z′e, y
′
e+2).
The simulator St follows a protocol similar to the original
ZKB++ protocol. The only difference is that for a multiplica-
tive gate c, the simulated view value view′ce+1 is sampled
uniformly at random, whereas the original view value viewce+1
is computed by subtracting Ri(c)− Ri+1(c), with Ri(c) and
Ri+1(c) the outputs of a uniformly random function sampled
using ke and ke+1. Thus, the distribution of viewce+1 is
uniform and view′ce+1 follows the same distribution in the
simulation. Therefore, the ZKB++ simulators output has the
same distribution as the original transcript (ze, ye+2) and
the output of the simulator St is indistinguishable from the
valid transcript to a corrupted verifier. Following the ideal
functionality of St, the ideal view of the service provider (i.e.,
{ct′,C ′bdop, H(m′[0]), (z′e, y′e+2)}) is indistinguishable from
the real view (i.e., {ct,Cbdop, H(msg), (ze, ye+2)}). Thus, the
ideal and real outputs are indistinguishable for the corrupted
PPT service provider proving the privacy-property of CRISP ’s
transfer phase.
Release Phase. We construct a second simulator Sr to prove
that CRISP’s release protocol (Section IV-E) reveals nothing
more than the result mˆ to a curious verifier. A different
simulator is required, as the release phase is independent from
the transfer phase. We consider that Sr knows the blinding
function ahead of time (i.e., it knows (ν, η)) for the real con-
versation leading to the service provider accepting mˆ. Upon
reception of the first message {ctψ, Bν,η(ctψ), C0, ψ(·)} such
that Decsk(ctψ) = mˆ, Sr creates mˆB using the blind-
ing parameters. The simulator commits to C ′1=Com(mˆ, mˆB)
which is indistinguishable from C1 to the curious verifier
according to the hiding property of the commitment scheme.
After receiving an opening for C0, the simulator opens C ′1
to mˆ and mˆB which sustain the verifier checks as defined in
Section IV-E. The binding property of the commitment scheme
asserts that (ν, η) is used for the blinding. The aforementioned
conversation between the prover and verifier is indistinguish-
able from the real conversation. By checking that the ciphertext
mˆ matches the expected output of the computation ψ(·), the
user is assured that the service provider is not using her as a
decryption oracle. If the value mˆ does not match the expected
output of the computation the user aborts.
B. Integrity
We present a proof of Proposition V.2 regarding the integrity
guarantees of CRISP. Let us consider a cheating user with
post-quantum capabilities as defined in Section II-B. She
wants to cheat the service provider in obtaining from the
public function ψ(·) a result that is not consistent with the
certified data. The public function evaluated by the service
provider is ψ(·) and returns mˆ on the series {msgi} of data
signed by the data source with the signature scheme σ(·).
We interchangeably denote by ψ(·) the public function in the
plaintext and ciphertext domains. As stated in [55] adapted
to [31], the binding property of the commitments used during
the MPC-in-the-head guarantees that ze (i.e., the container
z created for challenge e, see Appendix A) contains the
information required to reconstruct Viewe and Viewe+1. Given
three accepting transcripts (i.e., one for each challenge), the
verifier can traverse the decomposition of the circuit from
the outputs to the inputs, check every gate and reconstruct
the input. By surjectivity of the SHARE function, the veri-
fier can reconstruct x′ s.t. Φ(x′) = y proving the 3-special
soundness property (see proof of Proposition D.1 in [55]).
The completeness property of the ZKCE evaluation follows
directly from the construction of the (2,3)-decomposition of
the circuit. Thus, from a correct execution of τ iterations of
the protocol (parameterized by the security parameter κ), a
user attempting to cheat the ZKB++ execution will get caught
by the service provider with probability at least 1−2−κ. Hence,
a malicious but rational user can only cheat by tampering
with the data before they are input to the circuit, i.e., the
input messages or the encryption parameters. As the user is
rational, she samples proper noise for the BDOP commitment;
otherwise she would lose either privacy or utility: not sampling
noise uniformly from Skβ would lead to a privacy leakage;
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conversely, sampling noises in Rq with norm bigger than β
or with a degree above the threshold defined by the scheme
would lead to an improperly formatted commitment, and thus,
a potential loss in utility, as the service provider would reject
it. By the collision-resistance property of the hash function,
it is computationally infeasible for the user to find a collision
and discover a tampered message yielding the same hash. By
property D.3, the bound proof is correct and offers special
soundness: the service provider will detect a cheating user
that samples malicious noises to distort the encryption, with
probability at least 1 − 2κ. Note that in the case of an
abort, the protocol is simply re-executed. Finally, during the
release protocol, the integrity of the computation’s output mˆ is
protected by the hiding property of commitment C0, the hiding
property of the blinding function (seen as a one-time-pad shift
cipher in Zq which achieves perfect secrecy of ν·x, i.e., it
is impossible for the user to find ν and blind another result
as mˆB), and the binding property of C1 [55]. Therefore, in
CRISP users can only cheat with probability at most 2−κ.
APPENDIX E: NOTATION
Table III summarizes the notation frequently used in our
paper.
Notation Description
N Degree of polynomials in Rq
q=
∏L−1
i=0 qi Modulus of the plaintext space
Rq = Zq[X]/
(
XN + 1
)
Modular Polynomial space
p Precision of the data
L Maximum number of levels
λ Security parameter
U k×N Vandermonde matrix of 2N -th
roots of unity
χerr, χkey Small distribution over R
r0 CKKS noise sampled from χenc
(e0, e1) CKKS error sampled from χerr
(pk, sk, evk) CKKS keys
〈., .〉 Canonical scalar product in Rq
rc and rz Noise vector for the commitments
A1,A2 Matrices for BDOP commitments in
Rq
β Norm bound for honest provers ran-
domness
βc Norm bound of the BDOP challenges
n Width of the commitment matrix
k Height of the commitment matrix
lc Size of the committed vector
d Challenge for the bound proof
Caux(·) Auxiliary commitment
H(.) Hash function (SHA-256)
| · | Bit size
ki Random tape for player i
Φji j-th gate of player i
yi Circuit output for player i
xkj k-th bit of the j slot of d
βk, γk Carries for the k-th bit
αk Bit-wise sum of xk
C ZKCE circuit
msg={nonce, uid,x} Payload signed by the source
σ(·) Signature
M0={msg, σ(H(msg))} Message sent by the source
B Ball of norm β in Rq
[x]A resp. [x]B Arithmetic (resp. Boolean) sharing
P Proof generated by the user
M1 Message and proof sent by the user
Bν,η(·) Blinding function returning ν ·+η
C0 Commitment of the blinding parame-
ters
C1 Commitment of the results
mˆi Specific reconstructed message
|pi| Proof size in bits for the i-th iteration
κ Security level
|c|/|d| Commitment/secret bit size
|Com| Bit size of the BDOP parameters
|Enc| Bit size of the CKKS noises r, e0, e1
|t| Bit size of additional information for
the message mˆi
M Number of pre-processing iterations
τ Number of online iterations
M1 Message sent by the user
I Set of datapoints
ψ(·) Homomorphic computation
m True output of the computation
mˆ Output of the approximate computation
ε Relative error between m and mˆ
Table III: Notation Table
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